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Trade and Wages: Choosing
Among Alternative Explanations
Jagdish Bhagwati*
he decline in unskilled workers’ real wages
during the 1980s in the United States and
the increase in their unemployment in
Europe (due to the comparative inﬂexibility
of European labor markets vis-à-vis those in the United
States)1 have prompted a search for possible explanations.
This search has become more acute with the evidence that
the adverse trend for the unskilled has not been mitigated
during the 1990s to date.
A favored explanation, indeed the haunting fear, of
the unions and of many policymakers is that international
trade is a principal source of the pressures that translate
into wage decline and/or unemployment of the unskilled.
As Bhagwati and Dehejia (1994) put it: Is Marx striking
again?
I have examined the question of trade explanations
at great length in Bhagwati and Dehejia (1994), and the
issue has been extensively treated in Bhagwati and Kosters
(1994). My conclusion is that the trade explanation is
exceptionally weak for the 1980s, that there are good theo-
retical and empirical reasons why trade did not cause the
adverse impact one might fear, and that the case therefore
for the overwhelming role of technical change (biased
against the use of unskilled labor) in explaining the misfor-
tune of the unskilled is very strong, indirectly and directly
as well.
Here, I recapitulate and evaluate the main link-
ages that have now been advanced between trade and real
wages, extending the argumentation beyond that in Bhag-
wati and Dehejia (1994), originally ﬁnished in mid-1993,
in light of further research that has emerged since then. l
also take the opportunity to speculate about the future
instead of conﬁning myself to the 1980s experience and its
explanation.
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NORTH-SOUTH TRADE AND THE FALL OF
UNSKILLED WORKERS’ WAGES:
A STANDARD EXPLANATION
Most economists’ favorite explanation has been that trade
with the unskilled-labor-abundant South (that is, poor
countries), as a result of their entry into world markets and
the freeing of trade barriers against them, has led to the fall
in the real wages of unskilled workers.
This argument requires, in general equilibrium,
that the prices of the goods using unskilled labor should
have fallen too—as I noted in 1991 when encountering the
Borjas-Freeman-Katz paper (1991) asserting that trade was
the cause of the decline in real wages without mentioning,
leave aside examining, the behavior of goods prices (see the
detailed critique in Bhagwati 1991a and 1991b, and sub-
sequently in Bhagwati and Dehejia 1994 and Bhagwati
1994). I conjectured (1991a) that the goods prices had
actually gone the other way from that required by the
assertion.
The detailed empirical investigation by Lawrence
and Slaughter (1993), reported again by Lawrence in his
paper for this conference, conﬁrms my conjecture for the
United States. The subsequent attempt by Sachs and
Schatz (1994) to overturn the Lawrence-Slaughter ﬁndings
will not hold water. It relies on removing from the data set
the prices of computers, a procedure that can be debated.
Even then, the new data set yields a coefﬁcient of the
required sign that is both extremely small and statistically
insigniﬁcant. Some newspaper accounts (for example, the
recent survey in the Economist of North-South issues and a
recent Financial Times column by Sir Sam Brittan) have
reported this “ﬁnding” without realizing that, while Noam
Chomsky correctly argues that two negatives make a posi-
tive in every human language (while two positives do not
make a negative in any), the two negatives of a small coefﬁ-
cient, and a statistically insigniﬁcant one to boot, do not
add up to positive support for the assertion at issue!
Lawrence (this conference and 1994) notes this
and also reports that the goods price behavior in Germany
and Japan, with and without computers, does not support
the trade explanation either. Besides, the shifts in factor
ratios also do not support the explanation for the U.S. data.
In short, the necessary empirical evidence for the
absolutely critical element in this particular trade explana-
tion is, at worst, absent and, at best, exceptionally weak.
The news is not good then for the proponents of the trade
explanation along these North-South lines.
Besides, as noted in Bhagwati and Dehejia (1994),
even if the goods prices were behaving as required, the con-
clusion that the result would be a decline in the real wages
of unskilled labor requires added assumptions familiar to
the students of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, many of
which can be violated without difﬁculty in the real world.
We cite, in particular, a computable-model-based study by
Deardorff et al. of Mexico after the North American Free
Trade Agreement, which managed to show even a rise in
real wages of unskilled labor in the United States by relax-
ing one particular assumption of the Stolper-Samuelson
analysis: the assumption of perfect competition.
Three further comments are in order:
(1) Why have goods prices of labor-intensive
goods not fallen during the 1980s? I suspect that in the
case of traded goods, at least one major explanation is that
the VERs (voluntary export restrictions) on textiles, shoes,
and the like, as well as the antidumping actions against
several other products that broke out in the early 1980s,
may have led to restraints on exports that would translate
into a (countervailing) rise in U.S. import prices, and hence
in U.S. domestic prices. Ed Leamer has reminded us that
the Asian competition in textiles and apparel broke out
seriously toward the end of the 1970s, suggesting that the
decline in real wages in the 1980s was a lagged response to
that. But this explanation will not work: the swift response
of the industry to the increased competition from Asia was
precisely to tighten the Multi-Fiber Agreement’s restric-
tiveness to offset the potential price fall, leading to the
anti-Stolper-Samuelson-explanation price behavior that
Lawrence has observed for several countries. The restric-
tiveness of trade barriers is therefore likely to have
increased as required. Such elasticity and also selectivity
are in fact characteristics of the “administered” protection
as embodied in antidumping actions and VERs and make
them both a preferred instrument of protection by industry
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(2) Can we then be sanguine about future pros-
pects for this trade explanation? I believe that we can. Let
me explain.
The typical worry is, What happens when China
or India comes on board with the trade liberalization that
is occurring in many countries? But this concern presup-
poses that the resulting trade expansion will typically be in
the exchange of unskilled-labor-intensive for unskilled-
labor-unintensive goods. But there is a great continuum of
goods, and considerable trade takes place in differentiated
products among “similarly endowed” countries at all levels
of per capita income. One could then accommodate huge
increases in trade without the prices of unskilled-labor-
intensive goods falling.
Just suppose, however, that they will tend to do
so. Then there may well be an asymmetry with the 1980s.
If the Uruguay Round is ratiﬁed, there will now be
restraints on VERs—only one will be allowed eventually
per contracting party—and the Multi-Fiber Agreement
will be phased out in ten years. The ability to offset poten-
tial price competition from the South, in the way we did in
the 1980s, may no longer be possible.
But even if prices did fall in the end for imported
unskilled-labor-intensive goods in the next decade, recall
that it is by no means inevitable that this will translate
into a fall, rather than a rise, in the real wages of the
unskilled in the OECD countries. Bhagwati and Dehejia
(1994) have noted several reasons why, as Stolper and Sam-
uelson themselves have observed, all factors of production
can gain from the fall in import prices and the associated
trade expansion that trade with the South may bring. And
these reasons are not at all unrealistic, as I have already
indicated. It is, then, simply a fallacy to think that the
hand of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem is an iron ﬁst
aimed at our unskilled workers.
(3) But whether one is, in my view, an unnecessary
pessimist or an optimist on the issue, one policy option fol-
lows: we ought to support, not oppose, policy programs to
limit the growth of population (and hence unskilled work-
ers) in the South. The optimists will support such pro-
grams because they are surely desirable for the large
countries such as India and China. This is the considered
view of these countries’ policymakers, as evident from the
Cairo Conference on population this summer. The pessi-
mists should support them in our own interest as well. Let
me explain why.
If immigration, which directly brings these aliens
into our midst, cannot be totally controlled by us and bor-
ders often tend to get beyond control because our political
traditions prevent us from shooting at illegal immigrants
coming across borders, and if trade is also feared to be sim-
ply an indirect way of letting in such alien labor, both phe-
nomena then amounting to pressure on the wages of our
unskilled, then the situation is fairly grim. This is espe-
cially true if the decline of the ability to redistribute pre-
vents us from compensating the decline in real wages of
our unskilled. In that case, we can only hope for lower
pressures from the unskilled abroad. This implies our assis-
tance in accelerating their capital accumulation, on the one
hand, and in effectively controlling their population
growth, on the other.
The shift from the Bush administration’s more
complacent attitudes on population control, prompted
largely by the religious right, to the Clinton administra-
tion’s energetic support of effective population policies at
Cairo, prompted partly by liberal views of women’s rights,
can then also be explained as a response to the fears of the
adverse effect of trade with the South on the real wages of
our unskilled.
“KALEIDOSCOPIC” COMPARATIVE ADVAN-
TAGE AND HIGHER LABOR TURNOVER:
AN ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION
Bhagwati and Dehejia suggest an alternative trade explana-
tion for real wage decline. The explanation has essentially
four parts:
• Greater internationalization of markets—rising
trade-to-GNP ratios, greater role of transnational cor-
porations in globalizing production—together with
the diffusion of production know-how (à la Baumol et
al.) within OECD countries and the increased integra-
tion of world capital markets (à la Jeff Frankel) has
narrowed the margin of comparative advantage
enjoyed by many industries in any major OECD
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tries now than ever, leading to greater volatility in
comparative advantage, that is, more “knife-edge”
and hence kaleidoscopic comparative advantage,
between countries.
• This will lead to higher labor turnover between
industries and hence more frictional unemployment.
• Increased labor turnover could ﬂatten the growth pro-
ﬁle of earnings because of less skill accumulation.
• These three factors could also explain the increasing
wage differential, ceteris paribus, if skilled workers
have greater transferability of workplace-acquired
skills than do unskilled workers.
This theory has to be investigated; students of mine at
Columbia University are doing this. For example, Eugene
Beaulieu is using microeconomic data from the 1988-91
version of the Labor Market Activity Survey in Canada to
examine the hypothesis. The survey has a large and rich
data base and detailed information on several personal
characteristics of workers, which will enable Beaulieu to
trace the labor market experience of a sample of workers
before and after the Canadian-U.S. Free Trade Agreement.
He is also working with alternative measures of compara-
tive advantage and changes therein.
I might add that there is suggestive evidence on
elements 3 and 4 of the explanation above in labor studies,
as noted in Bhagwati and Dehejia (1994), and also in Lisa
Lynch’s paper for this conference.
RENTS AND UNIONIZATION
The above arguments are economy-wide trade explana-
tions. But there are industry-speciﬁc trade explanations, of
course, describing what happens to industries impacted by
import competition.
Where these are competitive industries, clearly
the earnings of the productive factors within them will be
reduced at the outset. When the industry is wiped out,
these earnings will go to zero, of course! Nevertheless, the
overall ﬁnal effect on real wages of these factors, including
the unskilled, cannot be determined without ﬁnding out
the general-equilibrium implications of the parametric
change, which will take into account, for instance, the
absorption of the displaced factors elsewhere in the economy,
which means going back to the economy-wide explanation.
What does the presence of unions, and hence of
rents to the unskilled in the unionized sectors, do for our
argument? There are indeed models of several kinds of
imperfect competition in factor markets in the general-
equilibrium analysis of international trade that could be
extended to address the question of the overall impact of
changing goods prices on real wages, but the answers can
be quite unexpected. For example, if unions maintain a
wage differential between homogeneous insiders and out-
siders, the conventional inferences such as that a fall in the
relative price of the unionized sector’s good will lead to a
fall in its relative production, and therefore presumably a
fall in the unionized factor intensively used in it, will not
necessarily hold, undermining the Stolper-Samuelson-type
argument (inferring factor reward changes from goods
price changes).2 To my knowledge, no analysis of the
effects of price declines in unionized industries such as
autos satisfactorily addresses these deeper analytical issues
that arise when the effects of unions are considered in an
appropriate fashion.
Then again, we know that during the 1980s, the
unionized sectors in the United States, especially autos and
steel, were politically powerful enough to shield them-
selves greatly through antidumping actions, VERs, and
OMAs (orderly marketing agreements) from the effects of
foreign competition (which, incidentally, was overwhelm-
ingly from the North, not the South). Given both the small
percentage of the U.S. unskilled labor force in unionized
manufacturing sectors and the substantial cushioning of
competition through trade restraints in any event, it is
highly unlikely that the analysts can demonstrate (through
this route) a signiﬁcant role for trade in affecting real
wages in the United States during the 1980s.3
THE QUESTION OF INTERNATIONAL CAPI-
TAL MOBILITY: GLOBALIZATION AND REAL
WAGES
So far, I have considered only the question of a direct link
between trade and real wages. But many observers fear that
international capital mobility also adversely affects the real
wages of the unskilled.46 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / JANUARY 1995
Thus, a major worry of the unions is that the out-
ﬂow of capital drives down real wages of unskilled workers.
However, during the 1980s, more direct foreign invest-
ment came into the United States than went out, both dur-
ing the period and relative to the 1950s and 1960s.
Moreover, the United States ran a current account deﬁcit,
so that foreign savings came in, if that is the measure one
wants to work with instead. The facts are therefore against
that hypothesis.
But again, if one uses a bargaining-type of frame-
work, it might be said that the bargaining power of
employers has increased vis-à-vis that of employees because
employers can increasingly say in a global economy that
they will pack up their bags and leave. Therefore, for any
given output, its distribution between unskilled-labor
income and other income, including proﬁts, may have
shifted against unskilled labor.
Perhaps the labor economists at the conference can
tell us whether there is persuasive evidence for such a bar-
gaining model as a determinant of relative rewards
between factors within any U.S. industry. They might also
tell us whether, for such industries, there is evidence that a
shift of location elsewhere has altered the distribution
against unskilled-labor income.4 I myself am unaware of
any systematic empirical or theoretical work on these ques-
tions to date.
At a time when total union membership is down
to less than 15 percent of U.S. private employment, how-
ever, I doubt if this explanation is likely to be important,
unless of course the decline in unionism is itself attributed
in a signiﬁcant measure (as I believe it cannot be) to the
loss of bargaining power stemming from ﬁrms’ threats to
exit to other countries.ENDNOTES (Continued)
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